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The purpose of this paper is the determination of sources and pattern of business cycle in 
Turkey throughout the period 1988-2002 using quarterly data.  The question of the paper 
is “Has financial liberalization increased the fragility of the financial and real sides of the 
Turkish economy?” The quantitative analysis of the paper includes the cross correlation 
and causality analysis.  Financial development indicators are the bank credits and capital 
flows, efficiency indicators are the domestic and foreign interest rate spreads.  It has been 
found that the pattern of real GDP is determined by demand side variables, whereas the 
source of fluctuations in the real GDP is the financial variables in Turkey.  External 
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I. INTRODUCTION: 
Financial liberalization policies that began to be discussed with McKinnon-Shaw 
hypothesis through the first period of seventies created important impacts from the point 
of not only the functioning but also the run of the whole economic system. Although the 
first experiments of the implementation of financial liberalization policy results could be 
described, at least, as being unexpected but it did not bring the end of those 
implementations for developing countries.  On the contrary, through the 1980s, financial 
liberalization gained impetus. The domestic market, which completed its integration 
within the whole market as it was claimed, went one step further and integrated with the 
world market. The results of international integration have been more unpredictable than 
domestic integration.  Financial turmoil turned into deep real-side crisis and it is 
described as the global crises. 
 
Through the 1980s and 1990s, a different approach of the neo-classical theory attempted 
to understand what was happening to the real economy.  As the new approach was trying 
to give a new shape to the structure of the economy, the real business cycles were 
figuring out the fluctuations of the real economy.  The cyclical variations of the real GDP 
were explained by real variables, like unemployment, total hours worked, and the real 
wages. At the end of the 1990s, another question appeared to be answered. “What is the 
relationship between the cyclical behaviors of real aggregates and those of monetary 
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aggregates?”  Furthermore, financial crises have triggered the curiosity about the question 
that “Is there any positive impact of the financial market on the real side fluctuations?” 
 
In the second half of the 1990s, the increasing frequency of financial and real crises and 
the unexpected realization of observations on the financial variables made the economists 
think about financial crises and real fluctuations together. The negative impacts of 
financial variables over the real economic fluctuations are mainly observed. 
 
Turkey is one of the examples on which all phases of the discussions about financial 
liberalization policies can be observed clearly. In September 1980, Turkey changed its 
economic structure from controlled economy to liberalized one step by step. Main 
economic policy that adopted from the mid-sixties was the import substitution policy. 
This policy was abandoned and encouraged exports with the great amount of subsidies.  
In addition, the import substitution policy was gradually replaced by import 
liberalization. Price mechanism became the basic indicator in order to provide the 
functioning of market. In that direction, the public sector became smaller and the 
government interventions were deceased.  In addition to the trade liberalization, tax and 
SEE reforms were realized. Flexible prices included exchange rate and interest rate 
determination, and TL was devalued at the rate of 48.6%. The limitations were 
implemented on the net domestic assets of the Central Bank and the net Central Bank 
credit to non-financial public sector.   
 
In 1984, foreign exchange rate regime was liberalized and residents were allowed to open 
a foreign currency accounts. Banks could engage in external transactions that were 
determined by the government. As inter-bank money market was established for short-
term borrowing activities in 1986, the government started open market activities in 1987.  
The chain was completed in 1989 and the capital inflows and outflows were allowed. 
 
The reel side effect of the 1980s has sourced from the groundless export-led growth but it 
can be described as the immature domestic market.  Economic actors were so 
inexperienced to utilize the opportunities of the liberalized economies.  The credit 
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allocation did not fill out its mission.  The private investment on the manufacturing sector 
was not sufficient to support the export-led growth, so opening the domestic market to the 
world market was a necessary action because of the limits of financing the export that 
was not feed by the real side.  Then, the 1990s were the years of huge amount of capital 
flows. The destiny of the economy was left to the justice of the international capital 
market.  Non-residents investors began to manage the route of the financial side of the 
economy.  Moreover, the breaking point, when the financial market was collapsing, it 
was sweeping away the real market. 
 
In this study, the main question is whether financial liberalization policies increased the 
fragility of the financial and real side of the economy for the Turkish case through the 
period 1988-2002 for quarterly data. The cyclical behavior of the financial variables and 
the real variables are examined together.  As defining liberalization policy indicators, two 
main targets of liberalization are taken into account: financial efficiency and financial 
deepening (development). Then, the relationship between these indicators with the real 
side variables has been examined. 
 
The domestic and external interest rate spreads are chosen for examining financial 
efficiency whereas bank credit is for explaining the impact of financial deepening. The 
short-term and portfolio capital flows are chosen to analyze the impacts of financial 
liberalization on the financial side and the real side of the economy.   
 
Next section of this paper includes a theoretical survey.  The third section consists of a 
quantitative analysis.  The first part of third section contains the investigation of the data. 
In this part, a brief overview of the Turkish economy, trends and irregular behavior are 
discussed. Second part includes the decomposition of the variables. For this purposes, the 
cyclical components have been separated from the seasonal, trend, and irregular 
components. Third part consists of an analysis of the relationship among the cyclical 
patterns of the economic series and the sources of business cycle. In this analysis the 
sources and patterns of cycles in real output (RGDP) have been related to the cyclical 
patterns of real GDP components (total consumption, total investment, private 
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consumption, private investment, public consumption, and public investment), of the 
financial developments and efficiency indicators (total credit, private credit, public credit, 
domestic spread, and external spread). Procyclical and countercyclical movements of the 
variables have been determined by the cross correlation coefficient.  In the third part of 
the quantitative analysis, we have attempted to establish an empirical link between real 
GDP (business cycle) and all the other indicators of our interest those are thought to be 
the sources of economic fluctuations in Turkey.  Thus in this part, some insights of the 
causality relationship between given economic variables can be gained by the Granger 
non-causality analysis.   Last section of the paper concludes the findings. 
 
II. THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
   II.1. Theory: 
In the beginning of 1970's, the investigated characteristics of developing countries 
opened the way for long debates on the policy implementation of financial liberalization 
policies. The liberalization on the ''domestic'' markets and the positive correlation of the 
functioning of undistorted financial markets with the real economic activity are defended 
but the fact that financial crises whose severity, frequency and volatility have increased 
with the application of international financial liberalization policies has put on the agenda 
of the investigation of the relationship between financial markets and the real economic 
activity. 
 
According to McKinnon (1973), there is a strong relationship between the large real cash 
balances processed by credit mechanism and the growth rate of investment and aggregate 
economic activity.  Any kind of intervention or direction on the set of all prices will 
prevent the equilibrium of all markets so no economic indicator will clarify anything 
about the market mechanism and the will of the market. For McKinnon (1973), not only 
the interest rate ceilings but also other types of intervention, i.e. directed credit 
mechanisms, make the economy underdeveloped because the intervening actions do not 
allow any market to choose the best and the most productive, so may cause the funds to 
flow into unproductive investment areas or into the same industries every time. Hence, 
any fragmented or ''repressed'' economy must be liberalized domestically, or in other 
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words, if the financial market can do many things for the real economy perfectly, it must 
be allowed to do so.  
 
Shaw has the same arguments with McKinnon. They both defend the argument that 
liberalized financial system can attract an increased volume of financial saving and in 
turn allocate more capital to efficient projects. This result contributes to economic 
growth. 
 
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) paper explains the credit rationing mechanism that stems from 
the inefficient information environment of financial market.  According to Stiglitz and 
Weiss, there are two main factors which banks take into account while making loan 
decisions.  One is the interest rate and the other is the riskiness of any project. In an 
imperfect and costly information environment, the interest rate is an important device to 
evaluate the riskiness of any project.  If the domestic interest rate is above the foreign 
interest level, which maximizes the expected return of the bank, then it shows that the 
project is riskier and it will decline the average expected return of the bank.  
 
The role of financial intermediaries whose existence is shown as an indicator of the 
development of financial market is not only mobilizing savings and trading of any type of 
assets but also diversifying the risk of individual projects over the market.  However, the 
information asymmetries prevent the correct risk diversification.  If the debt market does 
not improve any solution, either big financial crash will occur or real economy will face 
the fact of rationing inevitably. 
 
As it is reached to the twenties, the role of financial development, by increasing both the 
volume of financial transactions and the quality of all financial services as a result of 
domestic and international financial liberalization policies, on growth and development 
process is analyzed by the huge literature but the impact of the financial development on 
the fluctuations of the real economy is not focused intensively.  
 
There are some studies after the first half of nineties, which examines the impact of 
external, contagious shocks on the efficiency indicators of financial markets and the real 
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economic activity.  Agenor and Aizenman (1997) analyzes the impact of external shocks, 
triggered by the events elsewhere, on the real economy.  Agenor, Aizenman and 
Hoffmaister (1998) study the impacts of banking sector spreads for the output 
fluctuations in Argentina case. It is found that as the external spread and output 
fluctuations increase the domestic spread, the increase in external spread trigger the 
domestic spread but decrease the cyclical component of fluctuations.  
 
Aizenmann and Powell (2002) present a model that explains the not only the spreads in 
the interest rates but also the joint effect of the shocks and the imperfect information on 
the supply of credit and the employment and output.  The impact of the increasing 
volatility, i.e. external shocks to the economy, with the imperfect information makes the 
real economic activity fall significantly.  Many studies suggest that the credit channel is 
strong in many middle-income countries. The spread between lending and foreign interest 
rates, so called the external spread has a strong effect on GDP, and even stronger effect 
on credit.   
 
Financial liberalization caused capital flows to travel freely, which in turn made the 
domestic economies in middle income countries more fragile due to the movements in 
capital flows. As a result, in some policy circles it has been argued that it might be 
optimal to impose restrictions on capital flows and stop lending booms, which typically 
followed by financial liberalization, as they mainly reflect excessive risk taking. 
Although lending booms typically precedes twin crises, very few lending booms end in 
crises. Most of the time the final is not a crises, but a gradually decelerating credit 
growth. 
 
Kregel (1998) explains aftermath of the international stabilization policies and the 
reasons behind the 20
th and 21
st Century financial crises.  Kregel considers the link of 
financial crises to the combination of increasing free competition in banking and 
increasing free global capital flows.   
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   II.2. Applied Studies: 
Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2001) provide a theoretical survey about the impact of financial 
liberalization on investment, growth, financial deepening, and saving.  They analyses 
domestic liberalization and capital account liberalization using panel data from total 50 
developed and developing countries for the period 1970-1998.  They conclude that 
financial liberalization results in higher interest rates, lower investment, higher foreign 
direct investment, and higher gross capital flows in high income countries, however, low 
income countries do not have any such benefits of financial liberalization.   
 
Wyplosz (2001) examines whether or not financial liberalization is hazardous in 
developed and developing countries.  He concludes that fast liberalization activities have 
led to the 1990s crises.  However, liberalization may be useful to increase competition 
and reduce monopoly powers in an economy as long as it is a safe liberalization. 
 
Kaminsky and Schmukler (2002) construct a chronology of financial liberalization in 28 
developing and emerging market economies, and examine the short and long run effects 
of financial liberalization on capital market.  Their main findings are:(1) The financial 
liberalization chronology shows that different types of restrictions are removed during the 
domestic and international financial liberalization process over time.  (2) The pattern of 
liberalization is different for developed and developing countries.  Stock market is the 
first to be liberalized for developed countries whereas financial market is the first to be 
liberalized for the emerging market countries.  (3) Financial liberalization leads to larger 
financial cycles in the short run. (4) The immediate aftermath of liberalization is larger 
booms and crashes in emerging market countries.   
 
Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2002) examine the impact of international financial 
integration on macroeconomic volatility for a large number of developed and developing 
countries for the period 1960-1997.  They conclude that international financial integration 
does not increase macroeconomic volatility during 1990s.  While financial openness 
increases relative volatility of consumption.   
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Buch (2002) reviews the theoretical and the empirical models on the linkage between 
globalization and real sector volatility.  Similar work of Buch, Döpke, and Pierdzioch 
(2002) confirms that there is not a stable relationship between financial openness and 
business cycle fluctuations over time. 
 
   II.3. Selected Business Cycle and Liberalization Studies on the Turkish 
Economy: 
Alper (2000) analyses the sources of business cycle in two small open developing 
countries, namely Turkey and Mexico, for the period  1987-2000.    Alper  finds  that         
(1) Consumption expenditure is more volatile that real output in Mexico and Turkey.     
(2) Consumption has a high contemporaneous correlation with real GDP implying that 
any cyclical shock to income affects consumption. (3) Investment is the most volatile 
component of GDP. (4) Capital flow is important, strongly procyclical and one quarter 
leading variable.   
 
Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2000) investigates the role of finance providing empirical 
evidence on the link between depth and structure of a country’s financial sector and the 
severity of its business cycle using annual data from 70 countries for the period 1956-
1998.  They use financial development indicator as a proxy for asymmetric information.  
Their main findings are: (1) Highly developed financial sectors experience less 
fluctuations in output, consumption and investment growth, since these economies can 
absorb shocks more easily. (2) Private sector finance is important in reducing 
macroeconomic volatility.  Banks are thought to be important in reducing consumption 
and investment volatility, whereas availability of private sector credit helps to smooth 
consumption and GDP. 
 
Boratav and Yeldan (2001) identify and study the main stylized facts and processes 
characterizing the dynamic macroeconomic adjustment of Turkey since 1980.  They find 
that openness has a little impact on profits and investments, and liberalization has not 
generated a productivity gains in the leading exporting sectors.  They conclude that the 
  9 
Turkish adjustment experience throughout the post-1980 period shows a process in which 
a developing market economy trapped within the needs of integration with the world 
market. 
 
Celasun, Denizer, and Dong He (2003) examine the impacts of capital flows on the real 
side of the Turkish economy for the period 1990-1997.  They find that capital flows are 
positively associated with private consumption and investment but not with public 
consumption and investment. 
 
In this study, the link is constructed among the internationally integrated domestic market 
and the real economic activity.  The credit market is emphasized through both the 
domestic market efficiency defining as the spread between lending and borrowing interest 
rates and the international market efficiency defining as the spread between the domestic 
market rate and the world market interest rate.  According to the study, the increase in the 
probability of the default of the lenders that funds their investment in credit market will 
trigger the domestic and foreign financial market spreads. That will also increase the loan 
obligations of lenders. The real economic activity will be affected negatively from the 
increasing inefficiency of financial markets.  Moreover, the fragility of the real side of the 
economy will also increase. The fluctuations of the output will be observed as it 
decreases.   
 
If the economy is evaluated from the side of financial intermediaries, as the inefficiency 
problem of financial markets sourcing from not acquiring information, liquidity and the 
risk diversification is not solved, the impediments front of the real economic activity will 
not be overcome.  The models which analyze the relationship between the performance of 
financial intermediaries and the real economic activity support this view in a formal way 
through the long-term relationship but now there is another questions, especially gaining 
importance after the first half of nineties with the occurrence of frequent and deep 
financial crises. One is about the changes in the efficiency of financial intermediaries 
after the international financial liberalization activities. What the impact of integration 
with the rest of the world on the services of financial intermediaries is not handled with 
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formally. It is claimed that the international integration will provide the efficiency of 
intermediaries by increasing the number of instruments, diversifying risks over many 
lenders, providing liquidity and gathering information; hence increasing the efficiency of 
existing financial conditions but the proof of all claims is not supported empirically also. 
The other is about the other side of the real economy, fluctuations. In the short-term, what 
is the impact of financial intermediaries, the associated risk measures; such as external 
spread, credit channel, capital flows on the fluctuated real economic activity?   
Conclusively, if any shocks to the system as a reason, or any significant drops as a result 
of external shock can follow each other, there is another question, what is the relationship 
between cyclical behaviors between the financial variables and the real economic activity 
after the financial liberalization period? 
 
III. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
III.1. AN INVESTIGATION OF THE DATA: 
1.1. A Brief Overview of the Turkish Economy: Trends, Cycles and Shocks: 
In 1988 the Turkish economy went into recession because of insufficient financial 
sources.  The low level of economic growth necessitated to implement new economic 
adjustments and also to find new financial support to finance the deficit. 
 
In August 1989 the liberalization of the capital account created new financial 
opportunities for the government to finance the budget and current account deficits, and 
to achieve a high growth.  The restrictions on the capital flows were removed and the TL 
was become a convertible currency.  In addition, a substantial increase in real wages and 
the agriculture subsidies resulted in an increase in the domestic demand and in the budget 
deficit.  Financial deregulations and liberalization led to a lending boom increasing the 
facilities for bank credits and helped the deepening of the financial sector via increasing 
short term capital flows into banking sector. 
 
In 1990 the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) announced a monetary program 
in order to control the public sector credits.  The real effective exchange rate was 
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appreciated in order to slow down the inflationary pressure.  The first impacts of financial 
liberalization process in Turkey were the deterioration in the current account deficit and 
the appreciation of the TL.  Rapid capital inflows led to a rapid but a short economic 
recovery period.  Although the monetary program was successfully implemented in 1990, 
the early local election decision and the Gulf War in 1991 negatively affected the 
economy. 
 
Throughout the 1989-93 period short term foreign borrowing grew by 223%. The main 
source of the economic growth during this period was the monetary expansion.  The 
CBRT did not sterilize the capital flows from 1989 to 1993.  In 1993, open market 
operations led to a higher level of interest payments and thus worsened the public sector 
financial position, whereas appreciation of the TL and high economic growth led to a 
larger trade deficit and hence worsened the current account deficit.  All these adverse 
effects aggravated the devaluation expectations meanwhile higher interest rates escalated 
the inflationary expectations. 
 
In 1994, an artificial reduction in the interest rates caused a sharp increase in the currency 
substitution and a sudden capital outflow.  “1994 crisis” had the following destructive 
consequences: (i) The Turkish lira was sharply devaluated, (ii) the inflation speeded up, 
(ii) the interest rates increased, (iv) the real wages decreased substantially, and (v) the 
economy contracted by 6.1%. 
 
During the period 1995-99, the central bank sterilized the capital flows in order to stop 
the monetization of budget deficits.  However, this policy put further pressure on interest 
rates, and hence on inflationary expectations.  In 1995 capital inflows accelerated and the 
economic growth reached to 8.1%.  The sources of the economic growth were the 
domestic consumption and the private investment. Inflation declined, the real exchange 
stability stimulated exports and the current account deficit decreased. After 1996 the high 
interest rates and the inflationary expectations and thus the vulnerability and the risk of 
the financial sector increased once again.  They also increased the cost of production by 
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affecting the credits and the open foreign exchange position of the banking sector through 
uncovered interest parity. 
 
The “1997 Asian crisis” and the “1998 Russian crisis” reversed the capital flows to 
Turkey, and reduced the amount of external financing available for the budget deficit.  
This resulted in an increased pressure on domestic borrowing, and enlarged the size of the 
domestic debt, raising the real interest rates on treasury bills. 
 
In 1998 the CBRT announced a new monetary program and managed to reduce the 
inflation rate.  In August 1998, “Staff Monitoring Program” was signed with the IMF.  
1998 economic program led the inflation and the inflationary expectations to decline.  In 
1994, just after economic crisis, the CBRT chose to control monetary expansion and 
hence a tight monetary policy resulted in high interest rates, whereas, in 1998 the CBRT 
chose to control the exchange rate as an anchor and left the interest rate to the market.  In 
1999, however, the inflation rate jumped again, and at the beginning of the year the 2000, 
the disinflationary program was launched.  
 
“2001 crisis” abolished the validity of the disinflationary program, and the fixed 
exchange regime was abandoned.  Collapse of the fixed (pegged) exchange rate regime 
led to withdrawal of foreign capital in February 2001 and resulted in a direct and 
depressing impact on the banking sector.  All these brought about pressure on the 
currency.  Devaluation of the exchange rate and a sharp increase in the interest rates 




It is believed that quarterly data will give a good view of short run cyclical behavior.  In 
this analysis GDP, total/private/public consumption, total/private/public investment, bank 
credits to total/private/public sector, traded/non-traded goods production are used in 
logarithm forms and real. Traded goods production is defined as the sum of the 
production at the agriculture and industry sectors, and the rest of the production is 
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accepted as the non-traded goods production. Real capital flow defined as the net sum of 
short term capital flow and portfolio investments in TL and deflated by wholesale price 
index.  Domestic spread is the difference between three months inter-bank lending rate 
and deposit rate.  External Spread is equal to the three months deposit rate minus three 
months LIBOR on US$ plus inflation rate minus depreciation rate.  External spread is 
defined different than the uncovered interest rate parity because of over-valuation of TL 
during the investigation period. 
 
1.3. Decomposition of the Economic Series 
The macroeconomic indicators can be expressed as the seasonal variation, trend, cycle, 
and irregular components.  Seasonal adjustment removes the seasonal highs and lows 
(annual effects) with different smoothing techniques. When the seasonal effects are 
eliminated from the series, the component might display erratic movements. The cyclical 
component exhibits the short run regular or irregular fluctuations in the series. The trend 
component shows the accumulated effects of the fluctuations in the long run behavior of 
the series. When the trend and the seasonal cycle are extracted from the original series, 
the residual would correspond to an irregular component.  This component should be 
generated by a stationary stochastic process, and hence should have the characteristic that 
any segment of consecutive observations looks similar to any other segment of the same 
duration regardless of the time interval.  This component sums to zero over time.   
However, if the irregular component of a series contains non-random events, this results 
in a shift in the amplitude of the time series.  This is called a shock.  A shock can be 
defined as an additive outlier or a level shift.  An additive outlier shock causes a spike in 
the series, whereas level shift shock has a permanent effect on the series.  If the irregular 
component follows a trend, or a regular pattern, then it includes the features of the other 
components.   
 
In this analysis the purposes of decomposition are as follows: First, the elimination of the 
seasonal and irregular components from the economic series gives a clearer picture of the 
important characteristics. Second, the elimination of short run erratic movements 
improves the economic relevance of the estimation results.   
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Accordingly, the relationship among the cyclical patterns of the economic series and the 
sources of business cycle has been examined.  For the above purposes, the cyclical 
components have been separated from the other components following the two steps.  
First, the X-12-ARIMA model-based technique has been used to decompose the seasonal 
adjusted, irregular, and trend-cycle components of each series. Then, the cyclical 
components for each series have been extracted from the trend-cycle components by 
applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) de-trending filtering technique.   
 
1.4.Trend and Irregular Tendencies: 
The trend and the cycle components of real GDP have been shown in Figure.1.  There is a 
positive long run trend throughout the period 1988-2002.  However, in 1998 the increase 
in the trend component of real GDP slows down.  Table.1 shows the cyclical movements 
in real GDP.  The real GDP has completed approximately five cycles over the period.  
Each cycles exhibits a different pattern. Second and third phases last longer than the 
others. 
 
The trend and the irregular components of the series are shown in Figure.2 and Figure.3, 
respectively.  The negative impacts of the 1994, 1998, and 2001 economic crises on the 
macroeconomic fundamentals can be explained in terms of a change in the tendency of 
trends, and the large deviation in the irregular components.   
 
   Trend Components: 
An important benchmark to start analyzing the aftermath of financial liberalization in 
Turkey is the interpretation of the trend behavior of the series. The empirical growth 
literature and the literature on the determinants of real and financial crises explore that 
the main macroeconomic indicators are interconnected to the potential currency and 
banking crisis.  An investigation of a possible interrelation between the real and financial 
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Table.1: A Brief Time Pattern of the Business Cycle in Turkey: 1988:1-2002:4 
 
Business Cycle  Recession  Trough  Recovery  Peak 
I. 1988:1-1990:2  1988:1-1989:2 
6 quarters 
1989:2  1989:3-1990:2 
4 quarters 
1990:2 
II. 1990:2-1993:3  1990:2-1991:2 
5 quarters 
1992:2  1992:3-1993:3 
5 quarters 
1993:3 
III. 1993:3-1998:1  1993:3-1994:3 
5 quarters 
1994:3  1994:4-1998:1 
14 quarters 
1998:1 
IV. 1998:1-2000:3  1998:1-1999:3 
7 quarters 
1999:3  1999:4-2000:3 
4 quarters 
2000:3 









(a)  Real GDP, total consumption, private consumption, public consumption, traded 
goods and non-traded goods productions display a linear upward trend, but it slows 
down after 1998.  The correlation coefficients are higher than 0.90 indicate the 
strong co-movements of trends.  This result implies that the trend behavior or 
direction of the main real macroeconomic fundamentals in Turkey have been 
changed in 1998. 
(b)  The trend components of total and private investment, total and private credit, 
capital flow and external spread exhibit a non-linear trend.  Capital flow and the 
spread have an increasing trend up to 1994, after then they follow a decreasing trend.  
Investments and credits have a positive trend up to the 1998 crises and then the 
tendencies reversed. Interestingly, the trend in capital flow and external spread 
change the direction in 1994. These results show a high level of correlations, and 
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explain the coherent transition of trends between the financial development 
indicators and the corresponding real variables
1.   
(c)  Domestic spread shows an interesting trend, first increases up to 1994, then 
decreases up to 1998, and rises again.  This result shows the implications of the 
interest rate and exchange rate policies in Turkey. 
(d)  Downwards trend behavior in the public sector credit is consistent with the financial 
liberalization process.  Even though the trend in consumption has increased over 
time, the non-linear trend in public investment has changed the pattern just after 
1994. 
 
   Irregular Components: 
The plots of the irregular components attract the attention that all of the components are 
affected by the 1989, 1994, 1998, and 2001 shocks.  In Table.2 pair-wise high positive 
correlation coefficients of the irregular components of the real GDP with a corresponding 
variable reveal that a shock to the real total consumption; to the real private consumption; 
and to the real traded/non-traded production, respectively, is highly related to a shock to 
the real GDP.  That is, any production shock will directly affect the fluctuations in these 
variables
2.   
 
Shocks to production and external spread are negatively related to each other.  However, 
there is a weak relationship between the irregular components of real GDP and real (total 
and private) credits, real investment (total/private/public), respectively, implying that 
there is no synchronization of a real GDP shock with these variables. 
 
On the other hand, the irregular components of capital flow, public consumption, public 
credit, and domestic spread are not related the irregular component of real GDP.  This 
result implies that the irregular components of these variables are not affected by the 
same shock contemporaneously.   
 
                                                            
1 The pair-wise correlation results are not shown in the paper. 
2 Note that these variables are related in a non-causality manner, there is a contemporaneous relationship 
between them.  
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Table.2: The Irregular and Trend Correlations: 1988:I-2002:IV 
 
Contemporaneous Pairwise Correlation Coefficients   
VARIABLE  Irregular Components  Trend components 
Real Total Consumption  0.9010  0.998 
Real Total Investment  0.4544  0.831 
Real Total Credit  0.4232  0.938 
Real Private Consumption  0.8444  0.995 
Real Public Consumption  -0.0038  0.985 
Real Private Investment  0.3323  0.785 
Real Public Investment  0.3096 0.029 
Real Private Credit  0.3892  0.956 
Real Public Credit  0.1380  -0.963 
Real Traded Goods Prod.  0.8911  0.999 
Real Non-Traded Goods Prod.  0.9451  0.999 
Domestic Spread  0.1306 -0.363 
External Spread  -0.4903 0.691 
Real Capital flow  0.0458 -0.511 
  Shaded area shows the strong relationships.  Correlation coefficients between irregular component of real GDP with the 
irregular components of the indicators, and trend component of real GDP with the trend components of the indicators are 
shown in the table. 
 
 
III.2. THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOR OF MACROECONOMIC VARIABLES- 
THE DEGREE AND THE TIMING OF THE CO-MOVEMENTS: 
 
In this quantitative analysis the sources and patterns of cycles in real output (RGDP) have 
been related to the cyclical patterns of real GDP components
3 and of the financial 
developments
4 and efficiency indicators
5. 
 
Cyclical behavior of a macroeconomic variable has mainly two characteristics.  The first 
is “direction” and the second is “timing”. The direction explains the degree of co-
movements with the cyclical pattern of real GDP.  The “procyclicality” and the 
“countercyclicality” definitions are used as to evaluate the measure of the 
degree/direction of co-movements.  In some cases, the business cycle does not occur at 
regular and predictable intervals, this tendency is called “recurrent”, but not periodic.  A 
standard pattern of the phases recurs again and again.   
 
                                                            
3 Total consumption, total investment, private consumption, private investment, public consumption and 
public investment. 
4 Total, private and public credits. 
5 Domestic spread and external spread. 
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Regular and predictable pattern or tendency of the business cycles tendency is known 
“co-movement”.  An increase in real GDP might be followed by further increase, or a 
decline in real GDP to be followed by further decline is called “persistence”. The 
persistency of the business cycle shows the tendency and it is measured by the first order 
autoregressive coefficient. 
 
The contemporaneous movements of cyclical components for each variable with the 
cyclical behavior of the real GDP are determined according to the positive and negative 
signs of cross correlations at the four lags/leads interval. When a positive cross 
correlation coefficient approaches to 1, it shows the “strong procyclical” characteristic 
of the series.  The opposite is true for the “strong countercyclical” relationship.  A value 
close to zero indicates that two series do not move contemporaneously in any systematic 
way and in any clear pattern.  These series are called “acyclical” economic series. 
 
The timing explains the turning points (peak and trough) of a variable relative to the 
turning points of the real GDP (business cycle).  In other terms, timing explains the phase 
shift in the movement of a time series relative to real GDP.  Figure.3 in appendix shows 
the cyclical components of variables. 
 
An economic variable is a “leading variable” if it tends to move in advance of real GDP.  
This means that the peaks and troughs in a leading variable occur before the 
corresponding peaks and troughs in the real GDP.  This variable leads the cycle and is 
shifted backwards.  A “lagging variable” is one whose cycle peaks and troughs occur 
later than the corresponding peaks and troughs in the real GDP.  This means that the 
peaks and troughs in business cycle occur before the corresponding peak and troughs of 
an economic variable.  This variable lags the cycle and is shifted forwards.  Peaks and 
troughs of a “coincident” variable occur about the same time as the corresponding 
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a) Pattern and Source of Business Cycle:  
In this part of the paper it is conjectured that “the source and pattern of the real GDP is 
affected by the patterns of the components of real GDP, the financial development 
indicators (credits and capital flow) and the efficiency indicators (domestic and external 
spreads) during the financial liberalization process over the period 1988-2002.”   
   Cyclical Components: 
The comovements of cyclical components are determined according to the highest cross-
correlation coefficients of lag or lead values, which are significantly greater than the 
contemporaneous values of the correlations.  
 
Table.1 in appendix summarizes the cross correlation results.  The real GDP and the real 
total consumption are the first two series examined for the co-movement relationship.  
The result shows that the direction of the current relationship is procyclical with the cross 
correlation coefficient of 0.91.  It is a coincident variable.  Like total consumption, real 
private consumption has a procyclical relationship with the real GDP, 0.92, and it is also 
a coincident variable.  The cross-correlations decrease as the lead and lag numbers 
increase. For example, the fourth lag of private consumption has an effect of -0.31 on the 
real GDP where negative relationship observed after the second period.   
 
When the relationship between the real public consumption and business cycle is 
examined, it has been found that the cross correlation between the current real public 
consumption and the real GDP (0.49) is not as high as the cross correlation between the 
private consumption and the real GDP.  The public consumption displays procyclical 
movement and is a coincident variable.   
 
Accordingly, the results indicate that a high degree of correlation between real GDP and 
private consumption implies the synchronization. In addition, the procyclical and 
coincident characteristics of private and total consumption and also their volatilities 
support the view that rational individuals adjust their portfolio positions to smooth 
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consumption.  This can be explained in terms of “wealth effect” since the volatility
6 of 
investment (9.226) is higher than of consumption (3.343) and output (3.146).  
 
Real total investment, the real private investment, the real public investment has the 
highest cross correlation coefficients with real GDP, (0.85, 0.79, and 0.67, respectively).  
Total investment and private investment are coincident, but public investment is a lagging 
variable.  As in the consumption case, on average, the volume of private investment in 
total investment is more than the public investment and private investment has lower 
volatility than public investment during the period. 
 
As traded and non-traded sectors are taken into account, both of them have high positive 
cross correlation coefficients (0.95 and 0.98, respectively) with the current real GDP.  
They show a strong pro-cyclical characteristic and they are coincident variables. The 
result displays that there is no clear distinction between the tradable and non-tradable 
sectors in the light of procyclical relationship.  This is an unexpected result in the sense 
that traded sectors can have bigger borrowing opportunities in the international credit 
market than the non-traded sectors and could lead the real GDP fluctuations.  There is 
also a clear distinction between the tradable and the non-tradable sectors from the 
perspective of the external and internal borrowing opportunities. However, in the Turkish 
economy, there is a high dependency of the traded and non-traded sectors to the domestic 
credit market but less to the international borrowing facilities.  In addition, financial 
liberalization stimulates specialization of production through the reallocation of capital 
and promotes the total output.  However, in Turkey, financial liberalization has produced 
a depressing impact rather than specialization. 
 
The relationship between the real GDP and the real private credit is highly  procyclical, 
and the private credit is a lagging variable.  The timing of the relationship is unexpectedly 
from the real side to the financial side. The highest level of the correlation, 0.70, is 
observed between the current real GDP and the one period ahead of the private credit. 
The evidence is against the view that the financial development in the liberalization 
                                                            
6 The volatility of the series is measured as the percent standard deviation of the cyclical components. 
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process is expected to trigger the real economic activity. The relationship is also 
investigated in sub-periods. It is observed that the strength of the correlations increase but 
the timing does not change during 1987-2000 period. 
 
When the comovements between the cyclical behavior of the real GDP and the domestic 
and external spreads are investigated, both spreads show a countercyclical characteristic 
and they lead the business cycle.  The second lag of domestic spread affects the real GDP 
in a negative direction (0.57) but the real GDP creates a positive impact on the two period 
ahead in the future, while a negative relationship (0.58) is observed between the first lag 
of the external spread and the real GDP.   
 
Another leading variable in this analysis is the real capital flow.  The positive cross 
correlation coefficients indicate a procyclical characteristic between the real GDP and the 
capital flow.  In emerging market economies, capital account liberalization is expected to 
promote financial sectors, to reduce the cost of capital flow and thus to increase 
production. 
 
The cyclical components of domestic and external spreads move in the same direction 
with the cyclical component of real GDP, but it is shifted forward. 
 
  
Figure.2: Contemporaneous Relationships with Real GDP (Direction): 
Real GDP 
Countercyclicals                                                                                         Persistence 
External Spread                        AR(1) 
Domestic Spread                                  
                                                                           Procyclicals                 
                         Total Consumption                   
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     Public  Investment 
     Traded  Goods  Production 
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                                                                Capital Flow 
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Figure.3: Contemporaneous Relationships with Real GDP (Timing): 
Real GDP 
      Leading Variables                                                                                 Lagging Variables 
 
    Capital Flow        Coincident Variables   Total  Credit 
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    Domestic Spread        Total  Investment    Public  Credit 
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b) Cyclical Relationships Between the Components of Real GDP and the Indicators: 
This part of the paper investigates the conjecture that “the financial liberalization process 
has positive impacts on the production and spending through the amelioration of financial 
development and efficiency indicators”. 
 
The impacts of economic development and efficiency indicators on consumption, 
investment, and traded and non-traded goods production and also on each other are 
examined by the cross correlation analysis and results are reported in Table.2 in the 
appendix, and summarized at the Figure.3. 
 
   Real total credit, real private credit and real public credit are highly procyclical and 
lagging variable.  Economic development indicators all reach the peak and trough 
after consumption and investment in expansion and contraction periods, respectively.  
This means that, in Turkey, a higher level of consumption and investment put an 
upward pressure on credits.  Thus in an expansion, increasing lending activities show 
a response to higher real spending, and reverse case is in a contraction.  This outcome 
supports the view that bank credit to private sector is important in smoothing 
consumption and investment variability at the low-income countries (İyigün, Denizer, 
Owen (2000)). 
   Capital flow is countercyclical and lagging variable for total, private, and public 
credit, but procyclical and leading variable for total, private, and public consumption, 
total, private, and public investment, and traded and non-traded goods production.  
This results show that capital flow leads spending and production in the same 
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direction, however, lags credits in the opposite direction, in Turkey throughout the 
period 1988-2002. 
   Domestic spread is a countercyclical and leading variable for total consumption, 
private consumption, public investment, traded/non-traded goods production and 
capital flow but it is procyclical and lagging variable for total/private/public credit, 
total/private investment, and public consumption. 
   External spread is countercyclical and leading variable for total consumption and total 
investment.  It is an acyclical variable for all the other variables.  This implies that 
external spread does not move in any systematic way and contemporaneously with 
these variables. 
   External and domestic spreads have countercyclical behavior with capital flow, the 
former is a coincident but the second one is a leading variable.  This result supports 
the Turkish case that any capital inflow reduces current interest rate differentials.  A 
higher level of capital inflow leads to increase in the liquidity and hence reduce 
domestic interest rate, on the one side.  On the other side, it causes real appreciation 
of TL, and finally reduces inflation.   
    
The above results indicates that in the Turkish economy financial sector transmits the 
impacts of capital flow and external spread volatility to the real economy, and the effects 
of them are reflected by the financial sector variables. Domestic and foreign interest 
differentials and capital inflows are all thought to be very sensitive to the fragility of the 
Turkish financial sector.  In general, it is believed that as long as the interest rate is 
determined as a result of economic policy decisions rather than market conditions, and 
also as long as the real exchange rate is appreciated, then large and volatile spreads and 
capital flow will be unavoidable.  
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III.3. CAUSALITY RELATIONSHIP: 
 
In this paper, we have attempted to establish an empirical link between real GDP 
(business cycle) and all the other indicators that are thought to be the sources of economic 
fluctuations in Turkey.  Some insights of the short run causality relationship between the 
economic variables are gained by the Granger non-causality analysis.   
 
It is important to keep in mind two points about the causality relationship. First there will 
not exist a stable causality patterns if the results are different for the different lag length, 
namely 1 to 4.  Second there might exist reverse causality if the volatilities in variables 
are large.  
 
Table.3 and Table.4 in appendix illustrate the causality test results.  It is assumed that 
first if the results are the same for any two lag lengths the causality pattern is accepted as 
stable.  Second if the percent standard deviation of a variable is larger than 4 percent, the 
volatility of that variable is accepted as large. 
  25 
 
As it has been presented in Table.3 in appendix, consumption (except public), bank 
credits, traded and non-traded goods production, capital flow, and external spread all 
have a stable causality pattern with the real GDP, even though some of them have large 
volatilities over the period 1988-2002.  
 
Figure.4 shows that first, there is a contemporaneous rather than causality relationship 
between the Turkish real GDP and total consumption, private consumption, total credit, 
private credit, public credit, traded and non-traded goods production, and capital flow, 
respectively.  These results support that all these variables possess very similar cyclical 
characteristics (coincident) with the real GDP, and the cyclical movements are 
accompanied generating demand side effects.  Second, the real GDP causes the public 
consumption and investment in Turkey.  So the cyclical movement in the private sector 
spending is a reason, but in the public spending is a consequence of the real GDP 
movements.  External spread is also a consequence of the real GDP cycles.  Third, the 
mutual causality between real GDP and domestic spread explains the virtual spiral in the 
Turkish economy. 
  
Figure.5 represents some historical interconnections between the development and 
efficiency indicators and Table.4 in appendix presents the causality relationships between 
the different combinations of GDP components and the development/efficiency 
indicators.  A stable causality pattern has been obtained between total investment and 
external spread, public consumption and public credit, public consumption and capital 
flow, private consumption and private credit, public investment and capital flow, private 
credit and capital flow, total credit and capital flow, public credit and capital flow, total 
consumption and capital flow, traded goods production and capital flow, and finally non-
traded goods production and capital flow, capital flow and external/domestic spreads, 
respectively.  
  26 
 
 
Figure.5: Causality Relationship with Real GDP: 
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Figure.5 Panel.A shows domestic spread and total investment cause total credit, and then 
total credit causes total consumption.  Panel.B presents the causality relationship between 
domestic spread and the public sector investment and credit cycles.  The causality link 
from domestic spread to private credit is from spread to credit and a higher volatility in 
domestic spread and bank credits is a crucial result of high and volatile lending rates in 
Turkey.  Panel.C shows that total and private credits have a mutual causality with capital 
flow.  Capital flow is a result of external spread, public investment, private consumption, 
and non-traded goods production cycles, whereas it causes traded goods production.   
Public investment, private consumption, and non-traded goods production trigger capital 
flow, and capital flow contribute traded goods production in Turkey between 1988 and 
2002. There is a contemporaneous relationship between the economic development 
indicators, namely bank credits and capital flow.  This result supports the view that the 
removal of restrictions on the Turkish financial market (deregulations) has produced the 
synchronic movements of short run bank credits and capital inflow.  Panel.D summarizes 
the causality sequence of the cyclical components. Domestic spread causes both external 
spread and credits, and external spread causes capital flow. 
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The overall causality results support the view that the real side variables are closely 
related to the financial variables.  The prevalence roles of capital flow and spreads on the 
real variables are noteworthy results.  Capital inflows heavily relied on an arbitrage of 
interest rate differentials has made the pursuit of domestic stabilization more difficult in 
Turkey.  Foreign flows invested on government papers led to increase in domestic credits 
and liquidity in the Turkish economy.  These have increased international reserves and 
created an illusion of strong exchange rate.  On the other hand, heavily issues of public 
debt have put an upward pressure on interest rates, and proceeded interest rate 
differentials and attract more foreign capital inflows.  This has put upward pressure on 
the exchange rate in a high inflationary environment, and led to real appreciation in 
Turkey.  As a result, increases in trade deficit and budget deficit, and also real 
appreciation have presented unsustainable policies in Turkey and always ended with a 
crisis. 
 
Figure.6: Causality Relationships With Indicators: 
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III.4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS FOR THE TURKISH ECONOMY: 
Turkish economy grew with a high PSBR, high inflation rate, high interest rates, real 
appreciation of TL between the periods 1988-2002, but at the end of each expansion 
period and rapid growth, the economy experienced an economic crisis, such as 1994 and 
2001.  Bank credits were steered the production and spending in the boom periods via a 
higher level of capital inflows. Large interest differentials have always been attractive for 
the foreign investors and speculators.  In Turkey, both spreads exhibit high volatility 
throughout the period 1988-2002, but the external spread is more volatile than the 
domestic spread.  Domestic spread, in Turkey, is one of the highest one among the 
emerging market economies.  A high level of spreads means inefficient performance of 
the domestic financial intermediaries, even though it also indicates a high level of non-
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performing costs or imposed costs.  On the one side, as a result of a high level of 
government domestic and foreign borrowing to finance budget and trade deficits in 
Turkey, the cost of borrowing has risen and domestic spread has widen and hence 
become more volatile. In Turkey, both spreads exhibit high volatility throughout the 
period 1988-2002, but the external spread is more volatile than the domestic spread.  
Domestic spread, in Turkey, is one of the highest one among the emerging market 
economies.  A high level of spreads means inefficient performance of the domestic 
financial intermediaries, even though it also indicates a high level of non-performing 
costs or imposed costs.  On the one side, as a result of a high level of government 
domestic and foreign borrowing to finance budget and trade deficits in Turkey, the cost of 
borrowing has risen and domestic spread has widen and hence become more volatile.  On 
the other side, large external spreads led to the purchases of domestic assets, mainly 
treasury bills, by foreigners.   
 
The mutual relationship between the capital inflow and external spread has weakened the 
impact of capital flow on investment.  However, since the Turkish financial system is not 
sufficiently developed to cope with volatile capital flows, any weak or inconsistent policy 
resulted in sudden reversals in capital flows and hence led to a higher volatility and 
contraction of the economy. 
 
The results reveal that firstly, the pattern of the real GDP cycles is determined by the 
demand side variables, namely consumption and investment.  Secondly, the source of the 
real GDP fluctuations is attributed to the capital flow and bank credits via both the 
domestic and external spreads.  Thirdly, the relationship between the efficiency and 
development indicators explains the fluctuations in the real side of the Turkish economy. 
 
Throughout the financial liberalization period, markets in Turkey have not performed 
well and the increase in interest rates has not been sufficient to provide the capital 
accumulation.  Liberalized financial market has not been enough for the saving and 
investment opportunities. The imperfect nature of the financial system has led to the 
collapse of financial liberalization policies.  The lack of information, or in other words 
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asymmetric information, about the quality of borrowers has prepared the background for 
the distressed financial sector and the risk of lending has increased.  Thus real economic 
activities have not expanded, rather sunk into recession.  As Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) 
state, a higher interest rate will both invite the riskier projects to the market and also 
affect the incentives of existing borrowers to take projects whose payment probability is 
low. It is a fact that the information asymmetry between bank and borrower causes the 
probability of default be greater than zero.  The probability of default is directly related to 
the interest rate on credit. Hence as the interest rate on credit increases, the probability of 
default also increases.  Charging a high interest rate on credit is not optimal strategy for 
banks. The expected return on given credit should be optimized.  This phenomenon stems 
the fact that as lending rate increases, the credit will be directed to the more risky projects 
and thus this will reduce the expected payoff of banks from credit.  
 
The above explanation is about the credit mechanism and the determination of lending 
rate in a weak financial market.   In other words, it is about the credit rationing side of the 
credit mechanism.  In addition to the credit rationing, domestic and external spreads, and 
capital flows have also impacts on credit mechanism through domestic deposit and 
lending rates and the foreign interest rates.  It is so clear that banks can lend only if there 
exists excess resources.   
 
In this paper, the timing and direction relations between the credits and real GDP 
emphasize the mechanism behind the credit rationing in Turkey.  The results suggest that 
total credit is procyclical and lags cycle.  An increase in credit follows the increase in real 
GDP
7.  Thus economic expansion periods are the periods of increasing credits to the real 
side of the economy.  Investment is closely related to the credit.  Capital flows are also a 
source of investment in Turkey.  A higher capital flow follows a higher level of credits. 
Increase in investment leads to increase in domestic spread in the foregoing periods as a 
result of the supply and demand conditions in the credit market.  A higher level of 
demand for credit couples with a higher level of public sector borrowing and would put 
an upward pressure on the interest rates.  This result would, in turn, decrease the expected 
                                                            
7 This result is valid also for private and public credits. 
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payoff of banks.  This view can be supported by the result that there is a countercyclical 
relationship between the total credits and capital flows.  In other words, a higher 
investment would lead to a higher credit but a lower capital flows.  A lower capital flow 
means that the risk associated with the Turkish economy is increasing. So the external 
spread increases signaling a higher risk of the economy.  Moreover, a decrease in capital 
inflow would decrease future real GDP although investment is increasing.  This outcome 
reveals that a credit increase by bidding up interest rate is not healthy way to finance big 
projects because of a high risk associated with these projects and also a lower level of 
expected payoffs from these projects.  Accordingly, even in the expansion periods, the 
bank credits must be well controlled since a higher level of credit does not mean an 
increase in payoffs. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION: 
The purpose of the paper is the determination of the source and pattern of the business 
cycle in Turkey throughout the liberalization period.  The main question is whether the 
financial liberalization policies have increased the fragility of the financial and real side 
of the economy for the Turkish case through the period 1988-2002 for quarterly data. The 
cyclical components of the financial variables and the real variables are examined by the 
cross correlation and causality analyses.   Liberalization policy indicators have been used 
as the financial efficiency and financial deepening indicators.  The domestic and external 
interest rate spreads are chosen for examining financial efficiency whereas credit 
expansion is for explaining the impact of financial deepening. The short-term and 
portfolio capital flows are chosen to analyze the impacts of financial liberalization on the 
financial side and the real side of the economy.  
 
In this paper, if the analysis is evaluated from the business cycle side during the 
liberalization process, it is found that the pattern of the real GDP cycle is determined by 
the demand side of the economy, namely by consumption and investment, however, the 
source of fluctuations attributed to the supply side of the economy, namely bank credits 
and capital flow throughout the period 1988.I-2002.IV. 
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In addition, if this analysis is evaluated from the financial intermediaries side during the 
liberalization process, it is clear that inefficiency problem of financial market in Turkey is 
a source of economic instability.  Thus the financial liberalization process in the Turkish 
economy for the period 1988.I-2002.IV increased the fragility of both the real and 
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Table.1: The Relationship Between the Cyclical Component of Real GDP and Cyclical 
Components of Each Indicator:  1988:I-2002:IV 








(Cross Corr. Coeff.) 
t-i,              t+j 
Real GDP 
 
3.141  Persistent  (i=1) 0.832   (i=2)  0.402 (i=3) 
-0.056  (i=4)-0.005 
Real Total Consumption  3.343  Procyclical  Coincident 
(i=0)                  0.9120 
Real Total Investment  9.226  Procyclical  Coincident 
(i=0)                 0.8502 
Real Private Consumption  3.557  Procyclical  Coincident 
(i=0)                 0.9285 
Real Public Consumption  3.291  Procyclical  Coincident 
(i=0)                 0.4901 
Real Private Investment  9.716  Procyclical  Coincident 
(i=0)                  0.7989 
Real Traded Goods Prod.  3.084  Procyclical  Coincident 
(i=0)                 0.9521 
Real Non-Traded Goods Prod.  2.630  Procyclical  Coincident 
(i=0)                0.9833 
Real Total Credit  13.959  Procyclical  Lags cycle 
(j=1)                 0.7038 
Real Public Investment  13.694  Procyclical  Lags cycle 
(j=1)                 0.6746 
Real Private Credit  14.153  Procyclical  Lags cycle 
(j=1)                 0.7017 
Real Public Credit  21.022  Procyclical  Lags cycle 
(j=1)                 0.2742 
Domestic Spread  14.387  Countercyclical  Leads cycle 
(i=2)               -0.5723 
External Spread  27.567  Countercyclical  Leads cycle 
(i=1)              -0.5778 
Real Capital flow  109.543  Procyclical  Leads cycle 
(i=1)               0.6112 
Bold and italic shows the cross correlation coefficients.  
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Table.2: The Relationship Between the Selected Cyclical Components of Real Aggregates and the Cyclical 
Components of Development/Efficiency Indicators:  1988:I-2002:IV 
 
CHARACTERISTICS  Relationships 
Direction Timing 
t-i,              t+j 
 
Procyclical  Lagging 








(i=1)             -0.5464 
Real Total Consumption with 
   Real Total Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Capital Flow 
 
Procyclical  Leading 
(i=1)               0.5959 
 
Procyclical  Lagging 
(j=1)             0.7440 
Procyclical  Lagging 
(j=2)             0.5169 
Countercyclical  Leading 
(i=2)           -0.6453 
Real Total Investment 
   Real Total Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Real Capital Flow  Procyclical  Leading 
(i=2)            0.7254 
 
Procyclical  Lagging 




(i=3)            -0.4930 
Acyclical 
Real Private Consumption 
   Real Private Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Real Capital Flow  Procyclical  Leading 
(i=1)            0.5917 
 
Procyclical  Lagging 
(j=3)             0.3407 
Procyclical  Lagging 
(j=2)            0.3908 
Acyclical 
Real Public Consumption 
   Real Public Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Real Capital Flow  Procyclical  Leading 
(i=1)            0.6018 
 
Procyclical  Lagging 
(j=1)            0.6684 
Procyclical  Lagging 
(j=2)            0.4837 
Acyclical 
Real Private Investment 
   Real Private Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Real Capital Flow  Procyclical  Leading 
(i=1)            0.7515 
 
Procyclical  Lagging 




(i=5)           -0.4689 
Acyclical 
Real Public Investment 
   Real Public Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Real Capital Flow  Procyclical  Leading 
(i=2)            0.3328 
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Table.2 (Continues): The Relationship Between the Selected Cyclical Components of Real Aggregates and 
the Cyclical Components of Development/Efficiency Indicators:  1988:I-2002:IV 
 
CHARACTERISTICS  Relationships 
Direction Timing 





(j=2)             0.4285 
Acyclical 
Real Private Credit 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
Countercyclical  Lagging 





(j=2)                0.4266 
Acyclical 
Real Total Credit 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 









(j=2)              0.3257 
Acyclical 
Real Public Credit 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
Countercyclical  Lagging 
(j=3)            -0.3361 
 
Procyclical  Lagging 




(i=2)            –0.5661 
Acyclical 
Real Traded Goods Production 
   Real Total Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 




(i=1)              0.5525 
 
Procyclical  Lagging 
(j=1)             0.6632 
Countercyclical  Leading 
(i=2)            –0.5227 
Acyclical 
Real Non-Traded Goods Production 
   Real Total Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
Procyclical  Leading 
(i=1)              0.5799 
 
Countercyclical  Leading 
(i=1)             -0.3399 
Capital flow 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread  Countercyclical  Coincident 
(i=0)              -0.4683 
  External Spread 
   Domestic Spread  Acyclical 
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Table.3: Granger Causality Test Between the Cyclical Component of Real GDP and the Cyclical 
Component of Corresponding Variables- i=1,2,3,4,1988:I-2002:IV 
Variable(X)   i=1  i=2  i=3  i=4 
Real Total Consumption  No causality  No causality  No causality  No causality 
Real Total Investment  Mutual causality 
 
No causality  RGDP causes X  RGDP causes X 
Real Total Credit 
 
Mutual causality  No causality  No causality  No causality 
Real Private Consumption 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality  No causality 
Real Public Consumption  No causality 
 
No causality  RGDP causes X  RGDP causes X 
Real Private Investment  Mutual causality 
 
RGDP causes X  No causality  No causality 
Real Public Investment  RGDP causes X 
 
No causality  RGDP causes X  RGDP causes X 
Real Private Credit 
 
Mutual causality  No causality  No causality  No causality 
Real Public Credit 
 
X causes RGDP  No causality  No causality  No causality 
Real Traded Goods Prod. 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality  No causality 
Real Non-Traded Goods Prod. 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality  No causality 
Domestic Spread  Mutual causality  No causality  Mutual causality  X causes RGDP 
 
External Spread  Mutual causality  RGDP causes 
X 
RGDP causes X  RGDP causes X 
Real Capital Flow 
 
Mutual causality  No causality  No causality  No causality 
Results are accepted at the 5% significance level. Shaded areas show the stable causality relationship. 
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Table.4: Granger Causality Test Between the Cyclical Component of Real Variables and the Cyclical 
Component of Development/Efficiency Indicators- i=1,2,3,4  :1988:I-2002:IV 
 








Consumption causes Credit  Credit causes 
Consumption 
No causality  Credit causes 
Consumption 




Mutual causality  Consumption causes 
Ext. Spr 
Mutual causality  No causality 
Real Total Consumption with 
   Real Total Credit 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
 











Mutual causality  Investment causes 
Capital flow 
Mutual causality  No causality 
Mutual causality 
 
No causality  Mutual causality  No causality 
Real Total Investment 
 
   Real Total Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 










Mutual causality  Credit  causes 
consumption 
No causality  No causality 






No causality  Mutual causality 
 
Dom. Spr. causes 
prv. consumption 
Real Private Consumption 
   Real Private Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread  No causality 
 




No causality  No causality  No causality 
Mutual causality  No causality 
 
No causality  No causality 
Mutual causality 
 
No causality  Dom. spread causes 
pub. cons. 
No causality 
Real Public Consumption 
 
   Real Public Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread  No causality 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality 
 
Investment causes Credit  No causality  No causality  No causality 
 
Mutual causality  Investment causes 
capital flow 
Mutual causality  No causality 
Mutual causality 
 
No causality  Private investment 
causes dom. spread 
Private investment 
causes dom. spread 
Real Private Investment 
 
   Real Private Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread  No causality 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality 
 














No causality  Mutual causality  Dom. spread 
causes public inv. 
Real Public Investment 
   Real Public Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread  No causality 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality 
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Table.4 (Continues): Granger Causality Test Between the Cyclical Component of Real Variables and the 
Cyclical Component of Development/Efficiency Indicators- i=1,2,3,4:      1988:I-2002:IV 
 








Credit causes capital flow 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality 





Dom. spread causes 
private credit 
Real Private Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread   No causality 
 




No causality  No causality  No causality 
Mutual causality 
 
Dom. Spread causes 
total credit 
Mutual causality  Dom. Spread causes 
total credit 
Real Total Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
No causality 
 




No causality  No causality  No causality 
No causality 
 






Real Public Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread  No causality 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality 
 
Mutual causality  No causality  No causality  No causality 
 
Mutual causality  Capital flow causes 
traded production 
Capital flow causes 
traded production 




Dom. spread causes 




Dom. spread causes 
traded goods prod. 
Real Traded Goods Production 
 
   Real Total Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread  No causality 
 











Mutual causality  N-traded prod. 
causes Cap. flow 
N-traded prod. 
causes Cap. flow 
N-traded prod. 





Mutual causality  Mutual causality 
Real Non-Traded Goods Product. 
 
   Real Total Credit 
 
   Real Capital Flow 
 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
No causality 
 
No causality  No causality  No causality 
 
Mutual causality  Dom. Spread causes 
capital flow 
No causality  No causality 
Capital flow 
   Domestic Spread 
 
   External Spread 
External spr. causes 
capital flow 
External spread 
causes capital flow 
External spread 
causes capital flow 
External spread 
causes capital flow 
  External Spread 





Dom. spread causes 
external spread 
Results are accepted at the 5% significance level. Shaded areas show the stable causality relationship. 
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